This paper is part of a larger project on the urban and rural dimensions of election administration. There is a dramatic skew in the distribution of voters across local jurisdictions. We enumerate the state associations of local election officials and examine how they aggregate their members' preferences on election laws and procedures, with a focus on early voting policies. We hope that our findings will bring a much needed local focus to the nationalized discussion over election reform and highlight the nexus between politics and administration in a very important policy arena.
The passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) significantly increased the scrutiny of election administration in the United States. Scholars, policymakers, and practitioners have spent the past decade assessing election laws and administration, seeking improvements.
Today we have a better understanding of elections, and certainly there is no shortage of proposals to reform election laws in the United States. Many of these proposals have become ideologically charged and policy debates over them have achieved national prominence.
However, most of these reforms will be adopted and implemented by a highly fragmented and decentralized system of state governments and local election administrators. Almost all of the new election laws passed since in the last decade have been adopted at the state level.
Furthermore, there is tremendous variation in the size of local jurisdictions, which makes for very different experiences for voters and election officials in large versus small jurisdictions.
Very little is known about this process of state and local implementation of election laws, in particular the relationship between state policy makers and local election officials. In this paper, we begin to examine how local election administrators have their policy views heard as state legislatures consider reform. We will focus on the influence that state associations of election administrators have upon the policy debates. We hypothesize that these associations play a role in these debates, but that the voices that get heard depend upon the internal political dynamics of the organizations and the geographic distribution of voters within each state.
Because of how local government boundaries have been drawn, and longtime migration patterns, jurisdictions vary dramatically in terms of the size of the voting population they serve.
The geographic distribution of voters means that there are many more small jurisdictions than there are large-less than 6 percent of the local election officials in the United States serve more than two-thirds of the voters in national elections. The interaction of local autonomy and size disparities leads to real differences in how elections are administered. Local officials in heavily populated jurisdictions bear a disproportionate share of the challenges of election administration.
This means that larger jurisdictions tend to be more interested in policy and administrative innovation.
However, the skewed distribution of voters across local jurisdictions challenges election law and administration in two important ways. First, it challenges the presumption that uniform voting laws and procedures promote fairness. For example, a law that satisfies the needs of large jurisdictions may not be preferred by small jurisdictions. Second, it tends to place heavily populated urban jurisdictions at a numerical disadvantage in state deliberations about election reforms. The recommendations of local officials serving large jurisdictions may be drowned out by the more numerous officials in other jurisdictions who serve vastly smaller voting populations. As a result, the skewed geographic distribution of voters hinders innovation in election laws and administration in the places that need it most.
Innovation in Elections Takes Place Primarily at the State and Local Levels
Most of the innovation in election laws and administration takes place at the state and local level. With the exception of the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act in 2006, no federal election laws have been passed since HAVA was adopted in 2002. Given the highly partisan nature of many election law debates, it is unlikely that Congress will pass election legislation in the near future. It is instructive that practically all of the recommendations in the recent report from the Presidential Commission on Election Administration (2014) are directed at state and local governments. The report offers no major legislative proposals for Congress. (Bentele & O'Brien 2013) . At the same time, several states have recently adopted reforms, such as online or Election Day voter registration, designed to reduce barriers to voting.
Local jurisdictions are another important source of innovation in election administration and have been so for a long time (Ewald 2009 ). Local jurisdictions have a lot of discretion in enforcing state and national election laws. Thus, local jurisdictions have initiated many improvements in ballot design, in recruiting, managing, training, and evaluating poll workers, and in contacting and educating voters. At least recently, heavily populated jurisdictions have led the way in these innovations (Kimball and Baybeck 2013) . Many municipalities are also in a position to adopt more extensive reforms for local elections. Recent examples of reforms first adopted at the local level include early voting centers (Stein and Vonnahme 2008) , ranked choice voting (Neely and Cook 2008) , and pre-registration of 16 and 17 year olds. The federal structure of American government encourages state and local innovation. In elections, however, it also gives rise to a dramatic skew in the distribution of voters.
The Geographic Distribution of Voters across Local Jurisdictions
Previously, we have described the tremendous variation in jurisdiction size and the challenges that poses for election administration in the United States (Kimball and Baybeck 2013) . In addition to serving most of the nation's voters, heavily populated local jurisdictions also contain a younger, more diverse, and more mobile population. Large jurisdictions serve substantially more voters per polling place than small jurisdictions. Finally, large metropolitan jurisdictions contain many more sub-governments than smaller jurisdictions. All of these features of local government complicate the task of planning and holding elections in large jurisdictions.
The administrative challenges of holding elections in the largest local jurisdictions are concentrated in two areas: (1) maintaining accurate information about their registered voters, and (2) managing a large and complex system of polling places and poll workers. In turn, most of the difficulties facing voters and election officials, including long lines for voters, suboptimal poll workers, registration problems, poor voting experiences, and rejected absentee and provisional ballots, occur disproportionately in a small number of heavily populated local jurisdictions.
Thus, large local jurisdictions have the greatest need for reform and are a critical force for innovation in election law and administration.
To illustrate the size disparity in election administration, we identify 7,858 local jurisdictions that have the primary responsibility for administering state and federal elections within their specific geographic boundaries. We divide the universe of local jurisdictions into four size categories: small (serving less than 1,000 voters), medium (serving between 1,000 and 50,000 voters), large (serving between 50,000 and 500,000 voters), and extra-large jurisdictions (more than 500,000 voters). Jurisdictions with fewer than 1,000 voters are generally small towns that typically have just one polling place and a handful of poll workers. We expect these jurisdictions to have a different election administration experience than larger jurisdictions. In addition, roughly one-third of the jurisdictions in the country served less than 1,000 voters in recent presidential elections, so this serves as a natural break in the data.
We chose 50,000 voters as another dividing line because jurisdictions serving more than 50,000 voters tend to be in densely populated metropolitan areas with a large central city. Thus, larger jurisdictions have different infrastructure and transportation networks than the mediumsized jurisdictions, which are mostly rural and exurban counties. Finally, the extra-large category contains the 31 most populous local jurisdictions in the country. These jurisdictions are part of the largest metropolitan areas in the county and face disproportionate concentrations of many of the voting problems described above (Kimball 2013 [ Figure 1 about here] Furthermore, as the American population continues to move from rural areas to urban and suburban regions, the skew in the size of local jurisdictions is growing. Figure 2 [ Figure 2 about here]
The Geographic Distribution of Election Administration Preferences
There is renewed interest in American political science in the geographic distribution of political preferences, perhaps due in part to the scrutiny given to the impact of redistricting on political representation. As one of the classic works in political geography observes, "Voters cannot be regarded as scattered at random over the various constituencies" (Kendall and Stuart 1950, 188) . Several applications of this insight note that liberal voters and the poor are concentrated in densely populated urban districts in many countries. Even with neutral redistricting plans, this geographic distribution can produce electoral biases that punish leftist parties, particularly in countries with plurality election systems. In terms of Downsian spatial theory, the reason for the bias is that the geographic distribution of voters produces a left skewed distribution of policy preferences across districts. As a result, the preference of the median voter in the median district tends to be more conservative than the median voter in the nation (Rodden 2010; Chen and Rodden 2013) . This electoral bias then produces policy biases that favor wealthy interests (Bradbury and Crain 2005; Rodden 2010 ). Others pin the policy bias against urban interests in state legislatures on the size of urban delegations and the concentration of immigrants in cities (Gamm and Kousser 2013) . In any case, the geographic distribution of voters in a democracy can have a profound influence on political parties, elections, and public policy.
Research on the skewed distribution of voters across local jurisdictions has focused primarily on legislative districts as the geographic units producing political bias. Even in the presence of the "one person, one vote" criterion it is quite evident that policy bias emerges.
Urban interests -and Democrats -are at a disadvantage due to the geographic distribution of their populations (Chen and Rodden 2013) . It is our contention, however, that the policy process for election administration is further warped by this geographic bias in distribution of voters across local election jurisdictions. Whereas legislative districts are drawn to capture roughly equal populations, there are no such restrictions or guidelines on the units that conduct elections.
In fact, it is fair to say that the geographic boundaries of election jurisdictions -cities, counties, towns, and townships -have remained remarkably stable through time. Their boundaries also emerged through historical processes quite independent of any demographic shifts or current policy design. Since there is such a dramatic right skew in the size of local jurisdictions, the horizontal axis is displayed on a logarithmic scale to more easily fit the data on one page. As indicated by the dashed line in the graph, the median jurisdiction had roughly 2,100 voters in the 2012 election.
In contrast, the median voter in the nation resides in a much larger jurisdiction, one with approximately 144,000 voters. While the median voter lives in a jurisdiction where most of the election administration problems occur, the median jurisdiction experiences almost none of those problems. While the graph shows all local jurisdictions in the nation, the same skew in the distribution of voters is present in almost all states (Kimball and Baybeck 2013, Table 5 ). In most states, election officials serving heavily populated jurisdictions find themselves at a numerical disadvantage when competing with other local officials to influence policymakers. In this paper we focus on policies related to early voting. There is evidence that individualism is a more deeply held core value among rural Americans than among urban residents (Gimpel and Karnes 2006) , which also leads us to expect a stronger preference for convenience-based reforms like early voting in heavily populated urban jurisdictions. Unfortunately, we have not found public opinion data on early voting preferences where respondents can be connected to their local jurisdiction. The closest we get are questions on the Survey for the Performance of American Elections that ask about moving Election Day to a holiday or to the weekend (Stewart 2008 ). These policies are somewhat similar to early voting in allowing voting at times that may be more convenient for many voters. Table 1 shows support for both policies among respondents in local jurisdictions of different sizes. As expected, the results show modestly stronger preferences for holiday and weekend voting among residents of the most heavily populated jurisdictions.
[ Table 1 about here]
There is clearer evidence that election policy preferences differ among local election officials serving large versus small jurisdictions. For example, local officials in large jurisdictions are more supportive of additional staff and resources to help them cope with the challenging environment in which they serve (Kimball et al. 2010 Early voting has become a more contentious election policy as its use has expanded rather rapidly. A recent flashpoint is efforts in several states to restrict the early voting period and eliminate early voting on weekends or Sundays. This comes in the wake of organized "souls to the polls" efforts in some swing states to transport African Americans to early voting locations after Sunday church services in the last two presidential elections (Herron and Smith 2012) . One recent puzzle is that some states with GOP majorities in the legislature have limited early voting while another, Florida, recently restored previous restrictions on early voting. We believe that the distribution of voters across local jurisdictions, and the resulting configuration of interests in state associations of local election officials, helps explain this puzzle.
Our working hypothesis is that partisanship and jurisdiction size interact to predict the likelihood of support among election administrators. Table 2 A Republican administrator in a large jurisdiction might be willing to support expanded early voting policies, against her party's preferences, that would make the voting process more efficient and perhaps easier for citizens. Similarly, a Democratic administrator in a small jurisdiction -of which there are admittedly fewer of these -would be reluctant to support innovation.
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Figure 3 Percent of Ballots Cast by Jurisdiction Size in 2012 Presidential Election
The horizontal axis is on a logarithmic scale, which reduces the skew. The dashed line indicates the median jurisdiction by size (roughly 2,100 voters). The solid vertical line indicates the median voter (a jurisdiction of 144,000 voters). 
